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Abstract. When manipulating concurrent processe it is desirable to suppress their internal details 
and to consider two processe to be equivalent if their external behaviours are equivalent. Following 
Milner and De Nicola & Hennessy we take this external equivalence to mean that an observer 
cannot tel the processe apart by testing their response to the same stimuli. We introduce a form 
of testing (refusul testing) which is more powerful than that of De Nicola & Hennessy in that the 
observer not only tests whether a process will perform an action but is also allowed under certain 
circumstances to discover in a finite amount of time that the process will not perform an action. 
The equivalence associated with refusal testing 1s compared with De Nicola & Hennessy’s testing 
equivalence and Milner’s observation equivaleuse, and a sound and complet proof system is 
provided for refusal equivalence when applied to CCS processes. 
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. Introduction 
When manipulating concurrent processes it is desirable to suppress their internal 
details (how they are ‘programmed’ and ‘implemented’) and to consider two proces- 
ses to be equivalent if their external behaviours are equivalent. Following Milner 
[II] we take this external equivalence to mean that an observer cannot distinguish 
the two processes by registering a difference between their responses to the same 
stimuli. Milner talks of the observer ‘experimenting’ upon each process. This idea 
has been taken up by De Nicola & Hennessy [6] who give a formal framework for 
‘idsting’ equivalences. In this paper we use a similar framework but give the observers 
greater discriminatory power by allowing them to gather information about processes 
rejecting or refusing actions as well as accepting them. We call our kind of testing 
refusal testing. 
To start further back in the development of thinking about concurrency, it has 
frequently been pointed out that it is not sufficient to regard a concurrent process 
as a partial function from inputs to outputs (as might be appropriate for a sequential 
program). One has to consider the possible interactions between the process and 
the rest of the system as a computation progresses. Furthermore, it is not sufficient 
to consider the sequences of actions which a process may perform (the language 
which it accepts, in the terminology of automata theory). These traces do not give 
enough information to answer questions about deadlock. This led Brookes, Hoare 
and Roscoe [S] to extend the traces model for CSP to the so-cal!ed fai!ures model, 
a failure of a process P being a trace s of actions which P can perform together 
with a finite set of actions which P can ‘refuse’ after performing s. They postulate 
that the externally observable aspects of the behaviour of a process are precisely 
its failures, and they therefore identify processes having the same sets of failures. 
This identification has been shown to coincide with testing equivalence for strongly 
convergent erms by De Nicola & Hennessy [6, Section 6.3]. In this paper we do 
not accept heir postulate, as we allow the observer to gain information about actions 
being performable even after other actions have been refused. 
As Pnueli emphasises in [14], the type of semantics and the fineness of the 
equivalence between processes which is desirable will depend on the application. 
We do not comment on the matter in this paper, which primarily a contribution to 
the study of testing and the issue of how far observation equivalence [1 l] is testable. 
Related work 
We mention here the independent work of Baeten, Bergstra and Klop [2] on 
ready trace semantics, which like refusal testing is intermediate between testing 
equivalence and o bservation equivalence. They give a complete axiomatisation for 
finite processes (with no invisible actions). eady traces were first employed in [ 141, 
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where they were called barbed traces. In [I] Abramsky has shown how, if we extend 
the framework of refusal testing to allow tests which copy processes and tests which 
follow all the branches of the computation tree, we can obtain the full power of 
observation equivalence. 
Section 2 discusses how plausible refusal testing is, developing it in a fairly 
informal way and comparing the approach with those of Milner and De Nicola & 
Hennessy. Although it is meaningful in a wider context, in this paper we only 
consider it as applied to CCS processes [ll]. The precise definitions of the tests 
and the resulting refusur equivalence for processes are given in Section 3. In Section 
4 we show that this equivalence lies strictly between De Nicola & Hennessy’s tebkrng 
equivalence and Milner’s observation equivalence, but goes substantially beyond 
testing equivalence. Section 5 is devoted to characterising the congruence relation 
between processes which is obtained by demanding that they shoulcF be refusal 
equivalent in all CCS contexts. This relation is what must be considered if we wish 
to know when one component of a system may be exchanged for another without 
affecting the testing properties of the system. In Section 6 we describe proof systems 
for refusal congruence and its associated pre-orders, along the lines of those given 
by De Nicola & Hennessy for their testing congruence. These systems are shown 
to be sound and complete in Section 7. 
A shortened version of Sections 1-4 appeared as [13]. 
2. Testing and rejection 
A notion of testing has three aspects: 
(1) the basic units of information which an observer can gain by interacting with 
a process, 
(2) the tests which are applied, 
(3) the ‘logical’ use which is made of the results of the tests. 
We shall compare ‘refusal testing’ as described in this paper with the approaches 
of Milner [ 111 and De Nicola & Hennessy [6] under each of these three counts. 
( 1) Basic inforrna tion 
The only reasonable way in which one can gain information about a CCS process 
from the outside is by communicating with it via actions in the alphabet of the 
process. In pure CCS a computation proceeds entirely by labelled ‘hand-shaking’ 
communications between any two processes and no distinction is made between 
inputs and outputs. Milner [ 1 l] suggests that we think of a process as a ‘black box’ 
with buttons on it, one for each element of a (finite) alphabet A of actions. A basic 
experiment consists of the observer pressing the co-button, some Q E 
goes down, this means that the process has cepted Q (communic 
observer via a). f the button does not go is may mean e 
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action is rejected or that the process is diverging internally. One naturally asks what 
information one can have about the last two possibilities. In the observation 
equivalence of [ll] only acceptance is explicitly mentioned; in the case of testing 
equivalence one does not detect refusals finitely for two reasons: firstly when an 
experiment is run the observer can only register an acceptance or spontaneously 
perform an internal action, and secondly no distinction is made between a run 
which deadlocks and one which diverges. We cannot detect divergence from outside 
in finite time, but we might hope to do this for refusals of actions. In order to justify 
this hope we must make the concept of rejection precise by refining our description 
of the possible outcomes of a basic experiment, and see how information on rejection 
might be obtained. In a later work Milner [12] does distinguish the three outcomes 
(and modifies the definit!on of observation equivalence to take divergence into 
account): 
“An agent may be thought of as a black box, equipped with a button 
for each experiment. It also has a green light, which is lit ifI the agent 
is proceeding without responding to experiment. To attempt an experi- 
ment e on agent p we apply continuous pressure to the e-button; if the 
button goes down (after some time), then p has accepted the experiment, 
and if the green light goes off without the button moving, then p has 
rejected the experiment. While neither occurs (and if pt [can diverge], 
hen it is possible that neither will occur) we can conclude nothing”. 
SO a ‘green light’ or its equivalent will give us the information about refusals 
which we wanted. Notice that we cannot be satisfied with a simple model where 
after some fixed amount of time from the start of the experiment he observer can 
know that the requested action has been rejected if it has not been performed by 
then, for a number of reasons: 
Firstly the same CCS process might be implemented in many different ways, 
involving any number of ‘lower-level’ actions being performed to give the effect 
of a single CCS action. 
The black box may also perform arbitrary numbers of lower-level actions while 
making choices at a node of the computation tree. 
And then, of course, we wish to abstract away from knowledge of the invisible 
T-actions which might be holding up a result to the experiment. 
One possible mechanism for the green light is as follows: Suppose there is a 
monitor which receives information about all computational activity within the 
machine (the lower-level actions referred to earlier). Assume there is a bound 7 
known in advance for the machine on how long it can pause between such actions. 
Then if no activity is reported to the monitor for a period T, it can conclude that 
nothing further will happen, and the green light can be switched off at some 
subsequent ime. We must assume here that the process has been implemented in 
such a way that the machine cannot go on performing internal actions indefinitely 
if it reaches a stable state (no CCS action possible without further external stimulus). 
Notice that the time T does not have to be known to the observer. 
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A simpler and perhaps more attractive explanation of the green light is that there 
is a part of the machine which can check whether a stable node has been reached. 
The green !ight remains on until the machine establishes that this has happened, 
when it is switched off. 
The effect of either mechanism should be the same as far as the observer is 
concerned. The assumptions of the first seem reasonable but the second has the 
advantages of being less specific about the nature of the machine and of ignoring 
lengths of time completely. It does require the machine to be more ‘self-aware’ 
about whether it has reached a stable node, but a device may reasonably be expected 
to be able to tell whether it is stable, despite eventual stability being in general 
undecidable. In the particular case of CCS the (finite) set of visible or invisible 
actions immediately possible for a process may be obtaineo recursively from the 
process expression. 
(2) Tests 
An exact description of the tests used in ‘refusal testing’ will be given in Section 
3.2. For observation equivalence the tests are particularly simple-just requesting 
a single visible action. The fineness of the equivalence comes from the way in which 
information about acceptance is combined. A test in De Nicola & Hennessy’s ense 
consists of the observer equesting a sequence of actions, this sequence depending 
on the information obtained as the test progresses. There is no point in the test 
being conducted in a haphazard fashion as this simply reduces the information 
which the result gives us. So the test being carried out is a definite mechanical 
procedure and De Nicola & Hennessy can therefore think of the observer carrying 
out such a test as being another process. We adopt the same approach for refusal 
testing but take a different set of possible observer processes. DC Nicola & Hennessy 
take these to be just CCS processes with a distinguished action o to represent 
success. but we shall need transitions to correspond to rejections being reported as 
well. 
(3) Logical use of the tests 
It is easiest o compare observation equivalence (2) with the testing equivalences 
if we use the ‘characterisation theorem’ as it appears in, e.g., [ 121. This states that, 
for processes p, q, 
p=q iff M(p)=Aff(q). 
Here AfI( p) is ‘the afirmation set of formulas of Hennessy- ilner modal logic 
satisfied by p. See Section 4.1 for detailed definitions. 
Despite the simple nature of the basic experime s, observation equivalence is 
powerful at distinguishing between processes rmation sets involve formulas 
describing process behaviour with arbitrarily deep nesting of modal operators, and 
indeed arbitrarily many alternations of modalities. ilner [12] describes how the 
set of formulas satisfied by a process might be built u 
there are difficulties with his explanation-to put t 
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the experisnenter is required to synchronise with the process SO that invisible 
(T-)actions become visible; 
the nondeterminism is resolved by the experimental conditions (the ‘weather’) SO 
that, as Mm-m&y notes, observationally equivalent processes can be distin- 
guished. 
Testing equivalence may be outlined as folio De Nicola & Hennessy define 
remit sets R( o, p) c {T, 1) which say what can h en when observer o tests process 
p. Thus: 
T E R( o, p) if there is a successful computati 
I E R( o, p) if there is an unsuccessful compu 
where “I” is the CCS parallel composition oper r. Now testing equivalence (a,) 
p =I 4 iff for all o, R( o, p) = R(o, 4). 
Refusal testing is closely modelled on this, but we distinguish the two kinds of 
possible failure of an experiment- finite failure or divergence. Outcome sets 0( t, p) c 
ff, I} are defined for tests t and processes p by 
E 0( t, p) if there is a successful computation starting with t 1 p, 
ffE 0( t, p) if there is a finite failure starting with tip, 
J._ E 0( t, p) if there is a divergent computation starting with t 1 p, 
where “ 1” is similar to the “ I” of CCS. Refusal equivalence ( wR) is defined by 
p -R 9 iff for all t, O(t,p)=O(t, 4). 
We shall consider the effectiveness of the various equivalences in Section 4.2, but 
it does seem more straightforward to imagine ‘generating’ experimentally the result 
sets or outcome sets rather than the affirmation sets. However, when we come to 
compare the equivalences by interpreting the observers or tests in Hennessy-Milner 
Logic (see Section 4.3), we find that while testi equivalence does not take us 
beyond one alternation of modality, refusal equi lence while still (as previously 
stated) less powerful than observation equivalence does involve modal formulas 
with arbitrarily many alternations of modal operators. 
lence for CCS 
In this section we describe the processes, tests, computations and outcome sets 
precisely. As previously mentioned, we use ‘pure’ CCS without value passing. We 
follow essentially the version used in [6]. 
3.1. ccs 
CCS processes are described by terms (range 
using various operat 
er by u, v, w) built from variables 
ere are two nullary operators, 
cess). There are sets of actions 
n W-C (a E A). The inverse 
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bijection is also denoted by T, SO that CZ = cy. A u & is the set of all ‘visible’ actions, 
ranged over by a, b, c, . . . (and occasionally A ) There is also a single ‘invisible’ 
action, namely 7. For each action :,I A u d’ u {T} (ranged over by p) there is a unary 
operator on terms- if u is a term, then so is pu. As usual, we shall ofte.1 omit the 
NIL in an expression p NIL. There are two binary operators-if u, , u2 are terms, 
then so are u1 + u2 and u1 1 u2. A partial function S: A u d -3 A u A is said to be a 
renaming ifi 
(i) it is one-one, and 
(ii) if S(a) is defined then S( a’) is defined and S(d) = S(a). 
(as noted in [IO], renaming subsumes the relabelling and restriction of [ll]). For 
every renaming S there is a unary operator- if u is a term, then u[S] is a term. 
Finally, we have a variable-binding operation to allow recursive definitions-if 
u is a term in which every free occurrence of x is guarded, then so is ret XU, and 
all free occurrences of x in u become bound. Here (~9 occurrence of) x is guarded 
in u iff x occurs in some subterm pu’ of u. As only guarded recursions are allowed, 
progress can definitely be made as a recursive term is unfolded (this progress may 
consist of r-actions, and divergence is certamly not ruled out). A term is finite if it 
has no occurrence of ret . .-. A term is closed if it has no free variables. Closed 
terms are called processes (ranged over by p, q, r, . . . ). 
The term fl is included because we shall want to talk about the finite approxima- 
tions to infinite terms. Infinite terms involving IR ‘Ire of no use to us and could be 
disallowed, although it will make no difference to what follows. We shall need to 
be careful about what happens when we encounter an unguarded fi while conducting 
a test since it means that anything migilt be possible. So for any process p, let DF( p) 
hold precisely when there is no unguarded occurrence of fi in p ([63 defines a 
similar predicate). 
For each action p there is a binary relation dcl over processes with the intended 
meaning 
* p da q iff p may evolve to q by reacting to a request for a from the environment, 
@ p +’ q iff p may evolve to q by performing an internal action, independently of 
the environment. 
Define jcr to be the least relation satisfying 
(i) ~p-0, 
(ii) p/q implies p,+pz -+pq, p2+p1 +Pq and p1 Ipz+cLqlp~, p2lp1 +@p2I 9, 
(iii) p -# q, S(p) defined implies p[S] -+“@ q[ S], 
(iv) Pl +a 919 p2 4 q2 implies PI Ip2 4 41 I 42, 
(v) u[rec x.u/x] -CL q implies ret x.u -+P q. 
3.1. ark. As we have excluded unguarded recursions, {q I3p.p -M q} is finite 
for any p. 
Let pl,. . . ,. p,, be visible or invisible actions. Then 
P, .-IL,, 
P -4 
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denotes: 3r,, . . . , m_, such that p -Pi rl jcr2 l l 0 -#m-l r,+ *Cc, q. Furthermore, 
p +’ q denotes 
7 * u,r + . ..‘F*am7* 
P --_ 
if s = al.. . a,. The empty sequence is denoted by E. Define p&s recursively by 
p&e iff p erw and for alf p’ (p S p’ implies DF( p’)), 
p&as iff pS.& 
A process 3 is 
and for all pl’ (p =+” p’ imphes $4~). 
said to be strongly convergent if p&s for every sequence s. 
3.2 Tests irnd refusal equivalence 
In [6] the tests (observers) are CCS processes with a distinguished action o 
for success. Our tests are not CCS processes, but they are defined in a similar style, 
as terms with transition relations between them. 
X2, Definition. (i) WCC and FAIL are tests. 
(ii) Let A 6 A n d be finite. Let R, S be finite disjoint sets, S # (b. Let B = {b, 1 r E R} 
be a multiset of actions such that each a E A occurs in B and B only contains 
members of A. Suppose that t, (r E R), t, (s E S) are tests. Then 
t = c l&t,+ c At, 
WR SES 
is a test. Furthermore, for each r, s, 
br A 
t- tr, t- t,. 
(iii) Nothing is a test or a transition except by (i) or (ii). 
Here SUCC is the tesf which always succeeds and FAIL is the test which always 
fails. The + is similar to CCS +, and we take it to be commutative, associative and 
idempotent. The intuitive meaning of a test t as in (ii) is that one presses all the 
buttons in the set A simultaneously. The process p can make internal progress at 
any time. If some a E A is accepted (p +Q), testing continues with some t’ such 
that t’ is a summand of t. If all actions in A are refused, testing continues with 
some tj such that /?Q is a summand of t. In accordance with the discussion in Section 
2, this refusal must mean not only that p +P (all a E A) but also that no internal 
action is possible (p c*‘). As we have allowed partially defined processes, for p to 
reject A we must also insist that DF( p), since otherwise it might turn out that p -+= 
) or p *’ if p were more fully defined. This is formalised as follows. 
tion of a test t a plied to a CCS process p is a maximal 
ce starting from Ip and constructed according to the 
following rules: 
CC1 p -1, pb implies rip -2 tip’, 
CP2 
CP3 
p -f3 p’, t -fi t’ implies t 1 p S f[ p', 
e _ 
P A, all Q E A, p -& DF(p), t: t’ implies tip 2 t’lp, 
CP4 lDF( p) implies t lp - (*Q) tin. 
The labels above the ‘I*” may be omitted. In the above the “ 1” is used to represen 
t and p being placed in parallel; it is not, of course, the CCS operator “I “. Clearly 
t applied to p may have many possible computations. 
3.4. Definition. The outcome of a computation 
tolPo-)tllP1~“‘-*tnIPn-,*‘. 
tt (success) if tn is SUCC (some p7), 
ff (finite failure) if t,, is FAIL (some n), 
. 
I (divergence) if neither of the above. 
The outcome se? 0( t, p) of t applied to p is the subset of {tt, ff}l consisting of all 
outcomes of possible computations starting from t I p. Clearly, every computation 
has precisely one outcome. Divergence may arise either from the process being 
insufficiently defined (the computation terminates in t, la> or from the process 
keeping the test waiting for ever while it performs infinitely many T-actions. 
3.5. Definition. Processes p, q are refusal equivalent (denoted p 5R q) iff, for all 
tests t, 0( t. p) = 0( t, q). 
We allow as a special case a test t = CsEs at, which waits for the process to become 
stable (viz. p e7, DF(p)) before continuing with some t,. 
Notice that the tests go beyond what De Nicola & Hennessy allow in that further 
testing can take place after a refusal. 
The tests are nondeterministic; for instance, in the test 
aSUCC+a(b SUCC+{6}FAIL)+{a”)FAIL, 
if a is accepted, the experimenter has a free choice of whether to count this as 
a success or to continue testing by pressing b. 
*We shall see in Section 3.5 that a restricte eter istic, in 
sequential, tests will give tf,e same testing power. 
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We shall on occasion abbreviate tests by omitting summands of the form Q FAIL, 
AFAIL if they are the only summands starting with a, A respectively. Also {a’)t 
will be shortened to a”$. 
3.3. Examples 
(1~ ap+aq -Rap+aq+a(pt q) (see Fig, I). 
(2) 44 + bq) -R abp + abq (see Fib. 2). 
We m;oy briefly indicate why the processes in example (1) are equivalent by noting 
that any computation 
I](ap+aq+a(p+q))~=.~~r’((ptq!_ro*. 
can be transformed into a computation 
Y. 
(where r is one of p, q) with the same outcome. Example (2) illustrates how refusal 
testing ignores the point at which internal choices are made. In either case, to tell 
the two sides apart we would have to be able to test (and therefore make copies 
of) the processes obtairzd after doing the first a-action, and this is not allowed in 
our framework. Pn both examples the processes are not in general observation 
equivalent (for instance, when p = aNIL, q = bNIL). 
(3) Ta+b+.la+T(a+b) (see Fig.3). 
Fig. 1. 
Fig. 2. 
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The two sides are 
instance of their aravo 
refusal testing. 
ennessy testing equivalent notation =,)-an 
and so this is an example c,f thr greater power of 
Refusal testing is stronger tven in the absence of T-actions, as the next example 
shows 
(4) In Fig. 4, we have p =;I 9, but letting t be the test abZlulCjUCC we have 
a 4 P) = {tt, ffl, 00, 4) = {ff}* 
Fig. 4. 
3.4. Pre-orders 
Yhe reader may perhaps wonder whethe, ? is necesssary to introduce the undefined 
process 0. It is intended to be used in approximating infinite processes by finite 
processes, but could one do this just as well using NIL to curtail infinite computa- 
tions? A simple example shows why this will not work for refusal testing. Let 
p = ret XXX. Then we might regard p as the limit of its tinite ‘unfoldings’, {TV NIL1 n 2 
0). However, if we apply the test a’SUCC (‘refuse a’), we have 
O(a’SUCC, T”NIL) = {tt} (n 2 0) 
but 
0( GSUCC, ret x.7x) - {I} 
so that the behaviour of the infinite process cannot be obtained as a limit of the 
behaviours of its finite approximations. On the other hand, if we replace NIL by 
a, we get 
which is what we wanted. 
One of the aims of this paper is to give a complete proof system for refusal 
equivalence along the lines of that given for testi 
6). In dealing with intinite processes we encounte 
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possible to have two infinite processes p9 q such that p -R q holds without the finite 
unfoldings of p being equivalent to the finite unfoldings of q (a simple example 
wouid be p = ret x.&x, q = 4 ret x.bax). Then how can we infer p -R q from con- 
sideration of finite processes? The solution adopted by De Nicola & Henessy (and 
which we shall also adopt) is as follows: As well as equivalences (= i) on processes, 
De Nicola & Nennessy also introduce pre-orderings (G i). These are related by 
P ‘iq iff psi4 and qt_ip (i=l,2,3). 
Now they can deal with infinite processes using the induction rule: 
P-l for all p’ E Unf( p) 
. 
p&q 
ere Unf( p) is the set of unfoldings of p (Definition 5.11 below). In similar fashion 
we define three pre-orderings corresponding to the lower, upper (or Smyth) and 
convex (or Plotkin) powerdomains on the domain of outcomes {tt, ff},_ (here we 
follow the terminology of [ 151). 
efinition. Let X, Y be any nonempty subsets of {tt, ff}l. 
XC, Y iff Vx’Ex3y~ Y. x~.J, 
XC, Y iff ‘dyEY3x~X. xsy, 
XE~ Y iff Xc, Y and Xc_, Y. 
Let p, q be any two processes. By an abuse of notation, define 
p r=, q iff, for all tests t, 
p cu q ifI, for all tests t, 
p Gc q iff, for all tests t, 
Ok PI EL W,q), 
Ok PI SJ at, q), 
00, P) Gc W,qh 
The convex (or Egli-Milner) ordering C-~ is in fact a partial ordering on subsets 
of {tt, ff}l and so, clearly, 
pmRq iff pccq and qccp- 
If p is strongly convergent, then plainly, for any test t, _M 0( t, p). Moreover, Go, 
C-~ on {tt, ff} are just C, 2 respectively. Hence, we have the following proposition. 
. If p, q are strongly cowergent, ihx rzu q g-q lz:p. 
e Nicola ennessy testing is by contrast asymmetrical, in the sense that, for 
strongly convergent processes, p z2 q implies p t_3 q, but not conversely. 
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3.5. Sequential tests 
In Section 3.2 we gave a fairly broad definition of refusal tests in order to capture 
the full power of (finite) refusal testing. In this section we show that a much restricted 
class of tests (the sequential tests) gives the same testing power. These tests do not 
use nondeterminism, nontrivial branching or multiple button-pressing. As well as 
being simpler they reflect the way in which refusal equivalence can be decomposed 
into lower and upper pre-orderings. After showing that the two sets of tests are 
equivalent in strength we shall therefore work with the sequential tests in the 
remainder of the paper. 
3.9. Definition. The sequential tests are the subset of tests as in Definition 3.2 given 
bY 
(i) SUCC is a sequential test; 
(ii) FAIL is a sequential test; 
(iii) if t is a sequential test, then so are 
at + a”FAIL abbreviated by at, 
aFAIL+ iit abbreviated by iit; 
(iv) if t is a sequential test, then so are 
aSUCC + 6t abbreviated by ‘at, 
at + &SUCC abbreviated by it. 
Furthermore, for reasons which will emerge later, call the tests generated by (i), 
(iii) L-tests, and those generated by (ii), (iv) U-tests. 
W t proceed to show (Proposition 3.12) that the sequential tests (in fact, even just 
the L-tests) are adequate for refusal testing. 
3.10. Remark. It is technically convenient to deal with a test such as t = C,, s fit”, 
where the set A of actions initially requested is empty, as follows: Create ai new 
‘fictitious’ action e @ A u d u {T} such that no CCS process can ever engage in e (or 
Z). Then testing a process for stability is equivalent to testing it for a refusal of e. 
Thus, t can be replaced by t‘ = elFAIL+&,, i!t” since, for any p, O( t, p) = O( t’, p)- 
In particular, the test &UCC for stability becomes e”SUCC (or CFAIL). 
3. For any test t (as in Dejinition 3.2) there are sets of L-tests {t’ 1 i E I), 
{ ti lj E J}, { t “[ k E K} such that, for my p., 
ttE O(t,p) iff V tte Q(r’,g), 
iEl 
ffE O(t,p) iff V ttE O(tj,p), 
jeJ 
-LEO(t,p) ia V J_EO(tk,p). 
kEK 
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etch of proof. By induction on t. Base cases: 
tt E O(SUCC, p) iff 
tt E O(FAIL, p) iff 
ff E O(SUCC, p) ifI 
ff E 0( FAIL, p) iff 
I E O(SUCC, p) iff 
I E O(FAHL, p) iff 
tt E O(SUX, p), 
fi lse (the empty disjunction), 
false, 
tt E O(SUCC, p), 
I E O(SUCC, p), 
I E O( succ, p). 
Now suppose that t =CrER brtr+CsGs At, is a test, where A = {a,, . . . , a,,}. We can 
take A # fJ by Remark 3.10. Suppose further that for each r there are sets &, J,, K, 
of L-tests such that, for any P, 
ttE O(t,,p) iff v tte wl, PI, 
ie I, 
ff E 0( t,, p) iff v ttE act’,, PA 
ieJr 
_L E 0( t,, p) iff v l. (2 w, p); 
kez K, 
and similarly for each s. Then, 
ttE O(t,p) iff V ttE O(b,t,,p)v V ttE O(a’, . . . i&p) 
reR SES 
iff V V tt E 0( b,tl, p) v V V tt E O(a’, . . . i&t:, p), 
r~ R iE 1, scs iEfs 
ffE O(t,p) iff V V ttE O(b,&p)v V V ttE O(&. . . &ti,p), 
PER jEJ, SES jEJs 
1~0(t,p) ifi V V ~~O(b,t&p)v V i,/ ~~O(&...ii,&p). 
rcsR kEK, SES keK,s 
We had to be careful with 1 not to say 
_L E O(SUCC, p) iff 1 E O(FAIL, p) iff false 
since then our inductive step would give 
_LEO(t,p) iff false 
for any t, which is clearly false. I7J 
For anyp, q,p -R q i&for al/ k-tests f, o(f,p)= o(f,q). 
. By Lemma 3.11. n 
roposition 3.12 can do fuii refu sal testing with a particularly 
simple set of tests. on 3.16) that it is also possible to ignore 
the outcome ff and icola ennessy outcome domain 
{tt},_. This will bring the underlined sequential tests into play. 
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efinition. The dual d(t) of a sequential test t is defined by 
d(SUCC) = FAIL, d( F IZIL) = SUCC, 
d(at) = id(t), d( it) = ad(t), 
d(&) = gd( t), d(at) = a”d( t). 
Note that “d” is a bijection between L-tests and U-tests. 
a. For any sequential test t and any p 
tte 00, p) iff ffc OWW, PA 
ff-E 00, P) iQ9- ttE W(t), PA 
_L E 00, PI iff 1 E WW, P)- 
3.15. Definition. For any process p and test t, 
pmay t iff ttEO(t,p), p must t iff 0( t, p) = {tt}. 
We note in passing that, for strongly convergent p, 
p must t iff d(t) 
3.16. Proposition. For any p, q 
(a) p GL q, if, for all L-tests t, ifp may t, then q may t; 
(b) p G” q ifi for all U-tests t, ifp must t, then q 
Proof. (a): Note that p s,_ q iff, for all tests t, tt e Oft, p) implies tt E O( t, q) and 
ff E 0( t, p) implies ff E O( t, q), and so this part is immediate from Lemma 3.11. 
(b): Note that p cU q iff, for all tests t, 0( t, p) = (tt} implies 0( t, q) = {tt} and 
0( t, p) = {ff} implies O( t, q) = {ff} and Ie 0( t, pj implies 18 0( t, q). By Proposition 
3.12 it is enough to consider L-tests. So the result will follow from the fo!!owing 
three claims. 
Claim 1. For any L-test t there is a set {t’ 1 i E I} of U-tests such that O( b, p) = {tt> 
i$ AiEl p must ti. 
Proof. By induction on L-tests: 
O(SUCC, pj = {tt} iff true (the empty conjunction). 
Assume the claim to be true for t: 
O(at, pj = {tt} iff p ~FAILA /\ p 
iE I 
O(&,p) ={tt} iff p ustcFAILA /\ p 
iE I 
2. For any L-test t O( t, p) = {ff} iflp d(t)- 
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oof. This is clear by Lemma 3.14. El 
3. For any L-test t there is a U-test t’ such that I ti 0( t, p) i_trp 
roof. By induction on L-tests: 
I ti O(SUCC, p) iff true, 
1 ti O(aSUCC, p) iff I e 0( a’SUCC, p) iff p must CFAIL. 
Assume the claim for t # WCC: 
I fi! O(at, p) iff p must ct’, I e O(iit, p) iff p must at’. Cl 
We conclude this section by illustrating the need for the underlined tests by two 
examples. 
les. (1) a+~ ;cR a(T+fi)+T (see Fig. 5). Using L-tests we have 
0( ae’SUCC, a + 7) = {tt, ff}, O(&UCC, a(T+~)+T)+{tt, ff, I}. 
Notice that the processes are no longer distinguishable by the test if ff is identified 
with 1. Using sequential tests we have 
a + T must ijiSucc, lZ(T+~)+T~@SUCC 
(2) In Fig. 6 we have p tiR q, and again we can see this in two different ways: 
Using L-tests we have 
O( a&ze’SucC, p) = {tt, ff}, O( ab;te’SUCC, q) = {tt, ff, I} 
and using sequential tests 
P st a&SUCC, q a~ae’SUCC. 
It can be checked that in each example U-tests would not be sufficient to tell the 
processes apart with the outcome domain {tt}l. The processes in example (1) are 
A a 4; a z R P z 
Fig. 5. 
Fig. 6. 
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distinguishable by the e Nicola & Hennessy test TO + aw, but in example (2) 
P ==I 40 
4. Comparison of the e 
Having defined refusal equivalence, we can now give a precise comparison with 
testing equivalence and observation equivalence. There is a whole family of possible 
formulations of observation equivalence (=). We shall show in Section 4.3 that 
In Section 4.1 we shall define an appropriate version of observation equivalence. 
Section 4.2 is devoted to comparing the effectiveness of the three equivalences. 
4.1. Observation equivalence and Hennessy- Milner Logic 
Consider NIL and ret XXX. These are observation equivalent according to the 
definition of [ 11, p. 991 (indeed so are any two processes which have no visible 
actions). But 
NIL may C’SUCC, ret x.~xplag C’SUCC 
(any action c). So they are not refusal equivalent (neither are they testing equivalent 
in fact). We need a definition which takes divergence into account. The one that 
follows is modelled on that in [ 121. As before, s ranges over sequences of visible 
actions. 
4.1. Definition. Pre-orders & (k E o; are defined recursively by 
P 50 q always: 
p !&+, q iff, for all s, 
(i) p =$ p’ implies 39’ (q S q’ and p’ & q’), 
(ii) if p&s then qis and 
q :$ q’ implies Wp’ (p $ p’ and p’ 5k q’); 
p~qiff,forallkE~,p&q; 
p =kq iff p &q and q !+; 
p=qiff pgqand q&p. 
We have already alluded (Section 2) to an alternative way of viewing observatio 
equivalence, nip ely in terms of gic ( 
this will facilitate the comparison with the testing equivalences. 
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efinition (cf. Stirling [ 161). The formulas of HML are built up from constants 
T, F using connectives v , A and modal operators (s); [s]. Formulas are ranged over 
by 4, rlr, (4.. . . The satisfaction relation I= is defined by 
p I= T always; p t= F never; 
pI=4nJ/ iff pl=+andpl=+; 
pI=t$v$ iff pl=&orpl=$; 
p I= ($4 ifi 3p’.p & p’ and p’ I= 4; 
p I= [s]$ iff pJs and Vp’(p &p’ implies p’l= 4). 
efiaition, The modal depth of a formula is defined inductively by 
S(F) = S(T) = 0; 
S(4 A $4 = S(4 v rcI) = max(S(+), SW); 
SW&) = WSM) = w#4+ 1. 
Define afirmation sets as follows: For any p and k 3 0, let 
Affd~l=bPlp+ 4 and W)+, Aff(P)=bblP~ dh 
Now we can give the alternative form of observation equivalence, which we shall 
call afirmation equivalence for the purposes of this discussion. 
. efinition 
p Gq iff -~dPkAff&), 
P E*q iff Aff(p)cAff(q). 
e A 
k, ,A are defined by analogy with =k, =. 
osition. For any processes p, q and any k a 0, 
p &k q implies p&t q, p5q implies pEAq. 
roof. Just as in [12]. Cl 
The Characterisation Theorem is the statement hat the converse holds. Various 
conditions on transition systems (using an abstract + relation) which make it true 
are given in [ 1, 121. owever, it is not available to us with our present definition 
of observation equivalence using sequences of actions, as the following example 
QWS (cf. [12, p. 291). 
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rl =recx.n(bNILIx), r2 = ret x.tix + cNIL, 
where S restricts a, b, c, viz. 
Sk) = g g E A v a, g # a,ti, 6, 6 c, c’; 
S(g)undefined g = a, a, 6, 6 c, C. 
This is simply a construction within CCS of the process q = ret X.T+ TxTd where 
we use general multiplication of processes (and not just prefixing of actions) as in 
[3]. Finally, let p = q + ret x.dx. 
Now p g2 q. This is because p G@ d”, and for any q’ such thar q *d q’ we have 
d” & q’ (such a q’ must be either (Td)” or d(Td)“, some n 30). On the other hand, 
P =* q. Informally this is because the only difference betwen p and q is the extra 
d” summand in p, and any HML formula 4 such that p I== 4 can only talk about 
the computation tree of p down to a finite depth of visible actions so that a branch 
Tn+*(Td)n already in q can mimic the d” branch sufficiently that q I= C#I also. 
However, we do at least have the following proposition. 
4.7. Proposition. For jinite processes & and &t coincide. 
Proof. Use the condition that +’ should be image-finite given in the Characteristion 
Theorem of [12]. El 
Affirmation equivalence has more of an experimental character than observation 
equivalence -as previously mentioned, in [ 121 it is described how the affirmation 
sets might be built up experimentally. 
4.2. Effectiveness of refusal and other equivalences 
There are two ways in which to discuss the complexity of an equivalence between 
processes -in terms of manipulating mathematical descriptions of the processes, or 
in terms of ‘black box testing’. Only the former is considered here. For purposes of 
comparison with the testing equivalences we use the ‘affirmation’ form of observation 
equivalence. 
For affirmation equivalence we must see how complex the sets Aff(p) are 
(Definition 4.3). In the experimental scenario of [ 121 (alluded to in Section 2) Aff( p) 
is effectively generable. We briefly check that the argument carries over to the present 
setting: Note that +P is finitely branching (Remark 3.1) and so, by Kiinig’s Infinity 
Lemma, pis is recursively enumerable (&). Also, if p$s, then { p’l p *S p’} is finite 
(and can be found effectively in s and (the description of) pJU 
being given by a &-recursive definition (this is equally true for other versions of 
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observation equivalence which do not mention divergence-see [4] for the &- 
ecursion meorem). Hence, the equivalence zA and the associated preorder E” 
will be &. 
AS far as outcome sets are concerned, clearly, 
ttE O(f,p) is &, ff E O(?, p) is Z,, 
I E 0( t, p) is n, (using Kiinig’s Lem 
In the case of De Nicola & Hennessy testing, I o, p) is therefore 2, v n, since 
I combines finite failure and divergence. So bot nds of testing equivalence are 
&. Notice that if we defined new outcome sets t, p) C_ {tt, ff, 4) with 
ttE O’(Q) iff ttE O(Q), iff ff E O( t, p), 
1 E 0’0, p) iff -L @ 00, p), 
then 0’( t, p) is r.e. and -R is seen to be as complex as equality of r.e. sets. 
So all three equivalences are &. It is also the case that if we restrict to finite 
processes (no recursion), then the equivalences are in fact decidable since in each 
case there are rewrite rules allowing a ,dlechanical reduction to a ‘normal form’. For 
refusal testing this will be shown in Section 6.1. 
4.3. Interpreting tests in Hennessy- Milner Logic 
This section starts by showing that observation equivalence is %rer than refusal 
equivalence (Proposition 4.8) and that this is in turn finer than testing equivalence 
(Proposition 4.9). In Proposition 4.10 we show that testing equivalence is very much 
weaker than refusal equivalence when both are compared against the observation 
equivalence hierarchy. In Proposition 4.12 we compute a bound of ihe modal depth 
of HML formulas describing tests in terms of the ‘length’ of the test. This tells us 
how far up the observation equivalence hierarchy any particular test <an take us, 
so to speak. 
We have seen that refusal testing reduces to discovering, for a given process p, 
whether 
t (all L-tests t), p must t (all U-tests t) 
(Proposition 3.16). These properties of processes may be interpreted by HML 
formuias in a uniform way, viz. for each L-test (respectively I&test) t we can define 
a formula 4, (respectively (tl) such that, for all p, 
6 if% P I= 4% st t iff p t= ~5~. 
efore showing how 
formulas: 
p l= (s)T iff 
to obtain the C#$S and #,‘s, -GX give the meaning of the few 
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The construction of the +l’s and @,‘s is by induction on tests as follows: 
4 succ =T, rcI F, FAIL= 
h=mh, llts*= Ealh 
da = W(MF A MA), kN = [4((4T v WA- 
We omit the checks that these formulas are as claimed. The following proposition 
is now immediate. 
reposition. If p & q (indeed $fp !G* q), then p cc q. 
The converse is false in view of examples (1) and (2) of Section 3.3. 
We now turn to showing that De Nicola & Hennessy testing is weaker than refusal 
testing. In [6, Theorem 64.61 it is shown that the same testing power is obtained 
by restricting to observers generated as follows: 
for may: o::=w 1 ao, 
for must: o::=NIL~TuJ i aiti ITw + bo. 
i = 1 
It is plain that for ‘may’ testing these observers are subsumed by the refusal tests 
(simply replacing o by SUCC) and so for any p, q 
p CL q implies p G3 q. (1) 
The converse does not hold (see example (3), Section 3.3 above). To see that the 
same is true for ‘must’ testing, define a translation r from observers to refusal tests: 




C aio =al...gkFAIL, r(7w + bo) = i&(o) 
i=l 
(TO and kSUCC are tests for convergence in the two systems). 
o and process p, 
P st sa 0 iff p st r(o). 
Hence, 
p Lu q implies p G2 q. 
Then, for any observer 
(2) 
Example (3) in Section 3.3 can also be used to see that the converse does not ho1 
here either. 
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ion. For any p, q, p C-~ q implies p G 1 q. 
. From equations (1) and (2). Cl 
We now strengthen Proposition 4.9 by showing that testing equivalence is bounded 
by the second level of the observation equivalence hierarchy, while refusal testing 
is not bounded by any finite level. Part (a) of the next result is noted in [6, Section 
6.111 for strongly convergent processes. 
osition. (a) For any p, q, p E2 q implies p G 1 q. 
(b) mere is no n such that, for all p, q, p = g q implies p tL q. 
(c) mere is no n such that, for all p, q, p E= ,, q implies p =U q. 
roof. (a): Interpret De Nicola & Hennessy observers in HML in the way that was 
done at the beginrzlng of this section for refusal testing to obtain formulas 4,,, &, 
such that, for any process p, 
p may satisfy 9 iff p I= c#I~, p must satisfy 0 iff p t= &. 
The formulas &, & are 
In view of Proposition 4.5 it it is enough to show that &,, &, are of depth ~2 for 
any observer o. This is shown by a simple induction on observers, using the facts 
that for any a, s, 0, 
lMs1~ q l3m 
’ denotes logical equivalence. 
(b): Define processes prr, qn for each n 2 0 as follows: 
p. = aNIL, go = NIL, 
P n+l =a(b+qd+ap,, qn+l=a(b+pn)+aqn. 
Then pn an qn= On the other hand, letting t, = (aQ”aSUCC, 
that pn go qn* Since pn, qn are strongly convergent, by Proposition 3.8, qn Eu pn. 
tice that this example does not use T-actions. q 
ula describing ‘ tn’ or 
1Oj must have de at least n + 1. 0ne 
e depths of (forn s describing) tests. 
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. The length of a test is given by 
lh( SUCC) = Ih( FAIL) = 1 s 
For any (sequential) test t there are formulas &, q?i such that, for 
all P, 
p may t ia P I= 44, us4 t i$ p I= q!i: 
and 
w4) s Mt), 8(1,5:)slh(t). 
Proof. By straightforward modifications of the proofs of Lemma 3.11 and Proposition 
3.16 one can construct, for each t, finite sets 7’t_ of L-tests and 7’” of U-tests such 
that, for any p, 
p may t iff V p may t’, p must t iff A p 
I’E T,_ I’E Tu 
and, moreover, lh( t’) G lh( t) for all t’e TLu T”. 
For may it is therefore enough to ‘flatten’ the formula C#J, constructed at the 
h 
-+*:-- eF this section for each L-test t to obtain 4: such that uCrlllllllgj u1
4: eq dl and S(4:) s lh( t). 
This may be done by induction on L-tests using 
dh eq Wt where s is aI . . . a,,, 
+d,..&r eq (4bdF A 9 l 9 A IIa,1F A Mdd 
to reduce the depths of the 4,‘s where possible. 
The proof for must is similar. Cl 
Proposition 4.12 is best possible in view of the following example. 
le. Define processes p,,, q,, ( n 2 1) by 
Pl =7+-a, 41= a, 
p2=T+7b, q2=T+b, 
P n+2 =dbpn+&n), qn+2=bpn+Tb 
It may be shown that, for n > 1, pn =,, qn. 
t, = GSUCC, t2 = c?bSUCC, tn+2 = Gbt,. 
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Then, for each n 21, lh(t”)=n+l and 
P” may tn, 
Pn dCtn)9 
l Congruence re 
When we say that p is equivalent to q we really intend that it will make no 
difference if q is substituted for p, no matter what the context is. In the case of 
refusal testing this means that our primary interest is in the relation 
p -CR q iff for all contexts %[ l 1, %[ p] ‘-R %[q]. 
Contexts %‘[ -1 are defined exactly as CCS processes, except that a new nullary 
operator l is included. As with other equivalences over CCS processes it turns out 
that ‘+-contexts’ are crucial since they may require information about whether initial 
r-actions are possible, and this information is not revealed by -R (notice that up -R p 
for any p). As an example consider the context “0 +bNIL”. We have 
TuNIL -R aNIL 
owever, 
TuNIL+ 6NIL may b’SUCC, aNIL+ bNIL_ b”SUCC. 
In what follows let “c” stand for any of gL, c,, Go. 
p c+ q iff p + 1-5 q + r for all processes r, 
p SC q iff %[ p] c %[q] for all contexts %[ l 1. 
In Theorem 5.13 we shall show that, for any p, q, p r=+ q iff p 2 q, and shall also 
give a characterisation of p cc q in terms of pc q and some information about i&al 
T-actions. First we show (Lemma 5.6) that “G” is a congruence with respect o “I “. 
. (a) For any L-test t and any jinite process r there is a (jinite) set [t, r] 
s such that, for any process p, 
Plr YOff v P 
f’E[ r,r] 
(b) For any U-test t and any finite process r there is a (finite) set [ t, r] of U-tests 
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By induction on t, r. We use ihe fact that each 
p. 741 to aEA expression {a+] C;=, pirim The summand 
--lD);‘( r). 
(a): Base cases: 
[SEC, f] = {SUCC), [t,NIL]=[t,n]={t 
Suppose r = {a+} Cy=, piri (n 3 1). Then 
‘,a?, r]=a[tJu U [t, rj]U [J [at,rJu Lp 
p.j=0 cL1=z P,fT 
irectly equivalen 
eluded precisely 
(b): This is dual to (a) (in the sense that U-tests are 1 to L-tests) except that 
if 0 is a summand, instead of effectively ignoring it we [t, r] = {FAIL}. q 
efinitfor. For any process p define 
p (03 = Q , p(“+L c &4q’“‘(+ci}, 
P-Q 
The summand fi is included precisely when lDF(r). hly speaking, p(“’ is the 
synchronisatioii tree [ 111 of p truncated at depth n b We use truncations p(“’ 




we find a relation which is a congruence w & respect o the operators. 
If piEpi (i’ 1, l l m 9 n), then ~~=, ~ipiL~~=~ pip:* 
For anyp,r,n, pJr’“kplr. 
Proof. By induction on n using Lemma 5.4. •I 
5.6. Lemma. For any p,q,r, if p c q, then p 1 r r q 1 r. 
Proof. Take p, q, r where PE q. Take any test t. 
Claim. 3n.O(t,p]P)= O(t,plr). 
Suppose either tt or ff belongs to 0( t, p 1 r) by virtue of a computation of length k 
This computation does not use more than depth k of r, and so tt or ff belongs to 
0( t, p I F) by virtue of a corresponding computation. Also if I e 0( t, p 1 r), then, 
by Kiinig’s Lemma, every computation has length s k, some k So ..L e O(t, p 1 r’“% 
The cFaim follows by Lemma 5.5. Cl 
Let n be as in the claim. Then 
O(t,plr)= 00, plr’“‘) 
c 0( t, q 1 r(‘)) by Lemma 5.2 
EOk qld by Lemma 5.5. 
ence, plrcqlr as re 
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nition. For any p, q 
MC(p) (p ‘may converge’) iff 3pI.p & p’ and ~‘48, 
p ct q iff p cL q and if MC(p), then (p 1 iff q G), 
p CL q iff p G” q and if P&E, then (p 4 iff q L), 
p c:qiff pL;q andpgbq. 
a. For any p, q, if p d q, then p cT q. 
roof. It is enough to prove this for c,, cu. We only consider cL; the argument 
for c, is similar. 
Assume p c-: q and MC(p). Let 6 be a visible action such that p a”, q ab. 
Consider the context - + b. If p-T, then DF(p) and p+ 6 may e’bSUCC. So q+ 
b may e”bSUCC and q*‘. If p jT, then p + 6 may b”SUCC. So q + b may dSUCC 
and q -7 Cl 
In order to deal with infinite processes it is convenient to extend the various 
pre-orders to (possibly open) terms as in [6] by defining u 5 v iff up 5 up for all 
substitutions p of closed terms for the free variables of u, v. 
mma. For any operator OP (of arity k say) and any terms Ui, vi, if Ui C* vi for 
i=l,..., k, then op( ui,. . . , uk) C’op(vi, . . . , t)k). 
roof. It is enough to prove this for closed terms and for Ed, cu. We only consider 
tL; the argument for I= _u is similar. The result is established by the following four 
claims. 
. For sny p, q, r, if p C-L q, then p + r EL q + r. 
Assume p CL q. One shows by induction on L-tests t that, for any r, 
P+r y t implies q + r may t. 
It follows that, for any r, p + r C: q + r and hence, by Lemma 5.8, p + r C; q + r. q 
. For any p, q, 1~c, ifp G 4, th PP G w 
Straightforward. Cl 
. For any P, 4, r, V-P &q, thenplrctqlr. 
. Assume p ct q. In view of Lemma 5.6 it is enough to show: if 
PI 
I 1 r . erwise the conclusion is 
ere are two cases: 
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0) 
. . C(p). Then p jT iff q -+*. So we may as well assume p + q -4 Observe 
that 
if pcLq and DF(p), p++‘, then {a]p-(l}={a)q-O}. 
So, plainly, 
plr+’ iff qlr-‘. 
(2): lMC( p). Since MC(pI r) and r eT, there must be an a such that p +Y, 
r +‘. It is enough to show q 1 wT. ay aSUCC and so q 
q$ and sir+‘. 0 
Claim 4. For any p, q, S, ifp E: q, then p[S] CL q[S]. 
Proof. Much as in the proof of [6, Lemma 4.1.21. Cl 
5.10. Lemma. For any term u 
(a) 51E’u; 
(b) u[rec x.u/x] G’ ret X.U. 




(ret x.u)~+’ = u[(rec x.u)“/x], 
op( u1, . . . , ,),+* = op( u;+‘, . . . , $+I). 
5.12. mma. For any terms u, v, w 
(i) un czT u; 
(ii) if un gT v for all n, then u C’ v; 
(iii) if u ~~ w, then ret x. u ~~ ret x. w. 
Proof. This was inspired by [6, Lemmas 3.2.2, 3.2.31. By simultaneous induction 
on u (in particular the number of occurrences of rec.). 
(i): By Lemma 5.10(a), u” E’ u for any u. To sholv un+l C’ u we consider cases 
as in Definition 5.11. If u = op( u1 , . . . , uk), then u”+’ G’ u by (i) applied to the Ui’s 
and Lemma 5.9. If u = x, then u n+* cT u is clear. If u = ret x.u’, then 
U n+’ = d[u”Ix] CT u’[u/x] 
(by induction on n, Lemma 5.9 and (iii) applied to subterms of u’[ ts”/x], which 
must have at least two fewer rec.‘s than u) 
cT u by Lemma 510(b). 
(ii): Su at r-4, v are sue n G’ v 1 n. n CT 
using (i) applied to u. Take any test t and any substitution p of closed terms for 
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the free variables of u, 1). As in the proof of Lemma 5.6, there is an n such that 
0( t, up) = 0( t, u”p). But then 
O(t, up)= O(t, u”p)EO(t, up). 
It follows that u c v. One can check u c_~ v. 
(iii): Take u, w such that u !zT w. 
Claim. Vn (ret x.u)n CT ret x.w. 
Clearly, (ret x.u)’ cT ret x.w, by Lemma 510(a). 
(ret x.u)~+* = u[ (ret x.u)“/x] CT u[rec x. w/x] 
(by 
less 
induction on n, Lemma 5.9 and (iii) 
rec. .-) 
(by Lemma 5.10(b)). 
as required. n 
ET w[rec x.w/x] ET w 
Now, by (ii) applied to ret x.u, we conclude ret x. u zT ret x. w 
to subterms of u with at one 
5.13. Theorem. For any p, q the following are equivalent: 
(9 p Gc 4; 
(ii) p r=+ q; 
(iii) p z7 q. 
Proof. (i)+(ii): Trivial. 
(ii)+iii): Lemma 5.8. 
(iii)+(i): By Lemma 5.9 and Lemma 5.12(iii). Cl 
6. Proof systems 
In this section we shall give systems of axioms and rules which characterise wk 
and its related pre-orders. This has been done for observation equivalence (and 
finite processes) in [9] and for testing equivalence in [6], and what follows is closely 
based on those p; rs. 
6.1. Finite processes 
It seems worthwhile to deal with the simpler case when all processes are finite 
before proceeding to the general case. As we are excluding recursion we also omit 
Q and deal with wc R, only mentioning the associated pre-orders as an aside (I?oposi- 
tion 6.2). So our signature is 
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Notice from Theorem 5.13 that 
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p-iq iff pwRq and (p: iff q-&. 
Hennessy & Milner [9] present an axiom system for observation congruence zc 
over the same signature. Their version of observation equivalence is weaker than 
that of Definition 4.1, in that only one-step transitions of the form p +” p) are 
considered. However, the associated congruences are in fact the same for finite 
processes. To see this, first note that I-contexts allow one to obtain the power of 
&-transitions. For instance, if p a’, then 
p =%p’ iff blp & NILlp’. 
Now, use the Characterisation Theorem [9, Theorem 2.21. 
Since wk is weaker than xc, all of their axioms will be derivable in a system for 
+, but we shall need some new axioms. These will be 
IU jAx+pY=&x+TY), 
IX2 ~x+jLY=~x+~Y+I_c(x+ Y), 
“,‘, 
3 
~[~~~~~Z~~#i~J =T z, (/hiXi + PiY;:), 
R5 x+(x+ Y)=7(Xf Y). 
It is hard to ‘explain’ these axioms but the diagrams given in the proof of the 
Soundness Theorem 7.1 may be found helpful. 










if p is C pipi and q is C pje, 
then P14=CcLi(pi1q)+C~I(Pl4i)+ E dPilqj)v 
i i pi+; 
A8 
S(p)X[S] if S(p) is defined, 
otherwise, 
A9 (X+ Y)[S]=X[S]+ Y[S], 
A10 NIL[S] = NIL. 
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Their remaining axioms (A5, A6.1, A6.2) are derivable from the above. RS is true 
for zc (it is in fact one of Milner’s T-laws [ 11, Corollary 7.141) but Rl-R4 are not. 
The axioms Rl-R4 (and of course all the others) are derivable in De Nicola & 
ennessy’s ystem for = r (in fact, Rl is their Nl, R2 is their D5, and RS is their 
D8). All this is not surprising in view of the following theorem. 
6. eorem. Refusal congruence -CR on finite processes is precisely the congruence 
induced by Rl-R4, Al-A4, A7-AlO. 
roof. As in [9], one can give a procedure for converting each process into a normal 
form using the axioms, and then show that p -CR q precisely when their normal 
forms are the same. We omit the proof since it is a restricted version of the proof 
of Lemma 7.7 (see Remark 7.8). Cl 
Clearly, the proof of Theorem 6.1 gives us a deci&nr procedure for h k on fiGite 
processes. 
mark. In [3] it was shown that the axiom scheme A7 can be replaced by a 
finite set of axioms (using an auxiliary ‘left merge’ operator). Although we see no 
way tc do this for the scheme R4, we refer the reader to the complete axiomatisation 
of ‘ready trace semantics’ in [2] (for finite processes without invisible actions) to 
see ho 31 R4 could be replaced by a conditional axiom (plus some other axioms). 
Her are some derived axioms for -CR: 
Cl Cc i:I Txi = C Pxi 








Cl is De Nicola & Hennessy’s D2 (for III= 1 it is Hennessy & Milner’s A6.2), and 
they show how to derive it by induction from Al, Rl. We omit the straightforward 
derivations of C2, C3 (the latter is Hennessy & Milner’s A6.1). Here is the derivation 
of c4: 
=Tj.&x-tT(/LY+~)+T(~(Tx+TY)+~) by R1 
=T~x+T(~Y+jL(Tx+TY)+~+~) by R4 
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C4 would be an immediate consequence of the following De Nicola & 
axiom for = r: 
r\;3 /LX+T(~Y+Z)=T(~X+jLY+Z). 
This is not valid for -CR; for example, take 
p = a, X = b, 
Then the LHS is ab + Ta, which ust b;l&UCC, while the RHS is T(ab + a), which 
b”ab’SUCC. 
Two further De Nicola & Hennessy axioms which no longer hold are 
D4 X+TY=i(X+ Y)+TY, 
D6 pX+jL(X+ Y+Z)=pX+p(X+ Y)+j&(X+ Y+2). 
D4 was dealt with in example (3) of Sect% 3.3. To see why D6 fails, take for instance 
p =T, X = a, Y = b, Z = c. 
Then the RHS may CbSUCC, while the LHS ?bSUCC. 
It may be wondered what additions to our system are needed to characterise the 
pre-orders on finite processes. 
6.3. Proposition. The pre-orders E:, t: on $nite processes are precisely the precon- 
gruences generated by Rl-R5, AI-A4, A7-AI0 together with 
Ll TXCTX + Y, (in the case of EL), 
Ul 7X-t Yc:TX (in the case of EL). 
Proof. This is discussed for infinite processes at the end of Sectior 9.3. Cl 
6.2. The system ( ) for infinite processes 
We now extend our e-*% ._.ational system for finite processes to one which will be 
complete for infinite processes. The new system will characterise both kk and c:, 
and we shall be able to move between the two relations using 
p-kq iff pEEqandqE:p. 
The extensions to the system presented in Section 6.1 come almost entirely from 
De Nicoia & Hennessy, the exceptions being the induction rule , where we adopt 
the form found in [7] (there called ‘o-induction’), and 
This is derivable in De Nicola & ennessy’s ystem, but the roof uses their 
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which is unsound for CC (exampIe: take X - -a and take bfa; then Ta+ 
ay &WCC while a+ 6 b’SUCC). The other De Nicola & ennessy 
inequational axiom which we do not include, namely 
N2 X+7Yc7(X+ Y), 
is also easily seen to be unsound for E& 
Tables 1, 2 show the whole system, which is denoted by ( )- It is a system for 
deriving statements of the form u c v, u = v for CCS terms possi 
variables. Write ( j+um (u=vj if u&v (u=v) can be derived i 



















x+ Y= Y+x 
x+x=x 
X+NIL=X 
let u denote C ic, piUi(+fi), v denote Lie, FjVj{+a} 
UIv=Ci~, ~i("iIv)fCj~~CL~(Ulvj)+~p,~~, T(UiIVj)+(nlQ is a summand of u or V} 
PXCSI = 
i 
S(p)X[S] if S(p) defined, 
NIL 
otherwise 
(x+ Y)[S]=X[S]+ Y[S] 




T(Cic, ILJi)+T(Ci,c, cliYi)=TCiE, (PJi+PiK) 




u[rec x.u/x]Grec x.u 










(any substitution p of terms for some of the free variables of u, v) 
UGV 
(ii) p _ 
ret x.u E ret x.v 
(iii) 
Ui E Vi, ISiSk 
OP(U,, . - -, u&op(v,, . . . , v,) 
every operator op (appropriate k) 
w”tv, Wn<o 
UEV 
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We could in fact dispense with the open terms and their associated rules, namely 
s (i), (ii) (see [6, Lemma 3.2.31). But then proofs of simple equivalences become 
needlessly complicated as is shown in the followi 
6. xample. Let p = ret x.ax + ax, q = ret x.ax. Then ( )I-p = q. This may 
immediately seen by using open terms: 
)t-ax+ax=ax by A3 
+p=4 
For the closed-term proof we need a lemma. 
6.5. Lemma. For any u, n, ( ) -Subs (i), (ii)F u* c u. 
Proof. See [6, Lemma 3.2.21. Cl 
Now, show by induction using A3 that, for all n, ( ) Fp* = q*. Then p = q follows 
by Lemma 6.5 and Ind. 





=pX+fi by A3 
= RHS by Cl. 
RHSE~X+I_L(~X+~)+O by a2 
=p(~X+~(~x+fl))+a byR1 
=fiT(TX+n)+n by R5 
= LHS byC1. Cl 









P(Cigz, Txi)=Cie, Pxi (I’0c3) 




R+TCi,_, jli(TXi+R)=O+TCi,, /-LiXi 
T(x+~)=x+fi 
u[rec x.u/x] = ret x.u 
I. Phillips 
Q+T C /&i(TA’i+fi)Zc ; i C +i<yi_ 
iEl iE1 
Similar to that of C5, using 522, A3, Cl, 
T(X+n)=x+a. 
1 and R5. U 
a,, n2 ~2 n uy Y&J, awe 
shown in [6, Lemma 3.2.21 how to derive fixed-point induction 
U[VlX]E v 
ret x.uG v 
(indeed any system with the same rules and the axioms fi2, RECf). So the 
following is also a derived axiom: 
C8 u[rec x.u/x] = ret x.u. 
roof 
u[rec x.u/x]crec x.u RZCl, 
u[u[rec x.u/x]/x]c u[rec x.u lx] by Subs, 
ret x.u c u[rec x.u/x] by FP Cl 
7. Souudness and completeness of ( 
Our task now is to demonstrate that ( ) is sound and complete for E:, wk. 
7.1. Soundness of ( 
7. For any terms u, v, if ( )I-uco, then u r: v. 
Our proof will be sketchy as ( ) is so closely based on the systems of [6,9]. 
as the axioms are concerned we pass over Al-A+ A7’-AlO, al. RECd and 
%! are sound by Lemma 5.10. It remains to consider Rl-R5, a3. Notice that, for 
every closed instance p = q of Rl-R5, 
and in the case of fi3, neither side can converge so that, by Theorem 5.13, we need 
only show p -R q. roposition 3.12, it is enough that, for every L-tast $ 0( 6, p) = 
r any instance p = 5 it is not hard to see t 
utation t 1 q -+ l l 9 with the 
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same result (and vice versa). The transformations only afkct the first portions of 
the computations. Rather than provide the details we give some diagrams (see 
Figs. 7-9). 
R3 and Q3 are dealt with by the following easily established result: 
0 
( ) 
4 i Tj4 =CJ o(t,Pi) (3) 
i-1 i=l 
(any test t, processes pi). To justify R2, remark that 
00, p+qk w, PhJ W,q) (4) 
(any t, p, q). This together with (3) immediately gives LX2 when pl = T, namely 
Tx+TY=?x+TY+?(x+ Y). 
R2 when p = Q: follows from this using Cl. 
As far as the rules are concerned, we may note that 
are obviously sound by 
sound by Lemma 5.12. 
the definitions of C& 2:. Finally, 
cl 
7.2. Normal forms 
The proof that (R) is 
may be put into normal 
complete will proceed as ever by showing that processes 
forms which are now defined. 
s (a) and s (iii) 
s (ii) and are 
Fig. 7. RI. 
Fig. 8. RS. 
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Let D, E, F, . . . range over finite sets of visible actions, and let 9, Z!?, 9, . . . range 
over finite sets of finite sets of visible actions. 
7.2. nition. Define three kinds of normal form (nf) by simultaneous recursion. 
(1) p is in A-normal form iff 
p= c sp,{+W, , 
aED 
where each pa is in T- or &normal form (abbreviate T/&nf), and where if a is a 
summand of p, then fl is a summand of pa for each a E D. 
(2) p is in &normal form iff p is in A-nf and 0 is a summand of p. 
(3) p is in T-normal form iff 
where 
( I) 7 
( 2) T 
( 3) 
(14) 
( 5) 7 
P= c apa{+a)+ c TpD 
aeD’ DEB 
9 # 0 and, for each D E 9, pD = CUED up,D and 
each pa, p: is in T/Q-nf; 
if fi is a summand of p, then a is a summand of each pa, p,“; 
ifD,,D&S,then D,uD,dB; 
if D,, D+9, D,c_ D2, then, for each ae D,, (R)+p,D’+p?=pF; 
U 9% D’ and, for each aE DE 9, (R)t-pF+p, =pa. 
The equations in (74) and (~5) may be viewed as expressing p? c pp and p: c pa 
respectively. The diagram in Fig. 10 shows an example of a process in T-nf. 
Finally, we define: 
(4) p is in normal form iff p is in A- or T-nf. 
Fig. 10. 
. If p is in T/hIf, then ( 
If p is in T-nf, use IU. If p is in SZ-nf, use C7. 0 
rm Lemma). Given any jinite process p, we can effectively 
. Let p be a finite process. 
)kp= C %pi+ C Tqj{+ 
iel jEJ 
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(some I, J, either possibly empty), using Al, A2, A4, A7’, A8, , AlO, 8M as 
necessary. This is simply the usual operation of obtaining L1le computation tree of 
p by expanding occurrences of “I” (though, in fact, the argument does not require 
the pi’s and 
computation 
e’s to be so expancled). The proof is by induction on the depth of 
tree. Assume that each pi, s can be effectively put into a nf equivalent 
the result will follow from the next two lemmas. 0 
If p is in n. then pp may be put in to nf using ( 
Proof. There are three cases: 
(1): p = T and p is in T/&nf. By Lemma 7.3. 
(2): p =T and p is in A-nf with $1 not a summand. ( )I-rp=p+~p (use R5). 
But p +~p is in T-nf. 
(3): p = a. (a)~-up = asp (use Cl). So we can take p to be in T/a-nf by cases 
(l), (2)‘. Then up is in A-nf. Cl 
7.6. Lemma. If p, q are in nJ then p + q may be put in nf using ( 
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the depths of the computation trees of 
p and q. To keep the induction going we actually prove a more elaborate result as 
follows: For any p, q in nf we can find A(p, q) such that 
(i) w--P+q=4P, 4); 
(ii) A(p, q) is in T-nf if p or q is in T-nf, and in A-nf otherwise; 
(iii) a is a summand of A( p, q) iff Sz is a summand of p or q. 
(iii) will follow easily from (i). We define A by induction and prove by induction 
that, for p, q in nf, (i) and (ii) are satisfied. There are three cases: 
p, q are both in A-nf. 
One of p, q is in T-nf and the other ;s in A-nf. 
Both p and q are in T-nf. 
The first two cases are straightforward and so we only consider the third. So, suppose 
p = c aP,(+a}+ c TPD, 4 = c a%{+fi}+ c ??E= 
aeD’ DE9 aEE’ EE8 
Let8=9usu{DuEIDE~,EE~}.ForeachFE~,if3DE~.DEF,letDFbe 
the largest such. Similarly, if 3 E E 8. E c F, let Er-- be the largest such. &, EF will 
exist under the conditions specified because of condition (73) on T-nf’s. 
For convenience, abuse notation as follows: For each a E D” u E’ define 
i 
Pa if a E D’, 
Pa= Q if a e D’ and fi is a summand of p, 
NIL otherwise; 
i 
qa if Q E E’, 
%= n if a ti E’ and Q is a summand of q, 
NIL otherwise; 
ra = A( Pa, %)* 
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Furthermore, for each Q E FE 9, define 
i 
PF if I& exists and a E DF, 
p:= fl D E 9( a E D c F) and 0 is a summand of p, 
c NIL otherwise; 
if EF exists and a E EF, 
if aE E 8( a E E c F) and a is a summand of q, 
NIL otherwise; 
r,F= A( PC, 93. 
Finally, let 
where, for each FE 9, fF = CaeF arc and Q is added ifi it is a summand of p or q. 
We check that A(p, q) is in T-nf. Conditions (of), (72), (73) are immediate. To 
check (a4), let a E F, C_ F2, where F,, F& % 
ACPZ s9+m& 93 
(~5) may be checked similarly. 
Finally, we must show (i). For a E D’ n E’, 
=a(ptz+qa) 
= a(% +d by Lemma 7.3 
= ap, + a% by Rl. 
Also, for instance, ( )t-a(p,+R)+fk=ap,+Ilt by C5. So . 
b--Ah q)= c ap,,+ 1 a%{+a)+ 1 TrF* 
aED' aE E’ FE9 
(5) 
It is enough to show 
)k(Q+} c TVF = {n+) x TPD + c TqE (6) 
FE.9 DE!33 EE8 
(where a is included iff it is a summand of p or q), 8s combining (5) and (6) gives 
Suppose F E 9, F = D”v E” for some D” E 9, E”E %‘. Then D = D>, E = E ‘f; are 
= Du E. Moreover, ( ) k {n+}T( PD + qE) = {fi+}TrF using Lemma 
f, furthermore, 
E) =dPo+ 9~) 
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by R4, R.!, A3. Hence, 
) I- (a+)Tpr, + Tq, = {fk+}TqE + 7rg. 
Now, suppose DE 9 and is not defined. men 
by C6. Similarly, if E E 8 and DE is not defined, then 
) t- {fl+}TrE = {fl+}TqE. 
Now, suppose E E Zf and D = DE is defined. Claim 






(Rb-fn+h(q, +Tb) = {a+}7 qE + c a(p,D+ & 
QED 
=In+h( c dp,E+q,E)+ c 4p:+q,D)+aq: 
aEE-D (RED 
={fi+}T c a(p,“+qi)=(fk+}TrE 
atzE 
Hence, 
= {fi+}T(qE + rD) + TrD = {a-t-}TrE. + TrD 
and (11) is proved. We can now show (6): 
)+{a+) c TPD+ c TqE 
DE9 EE8 
= {a+) c TJb+ c TqE + c TrF by (7) 
DES EE’ig F=DuE 
F’E~,EE$ 
=(a+) c TrD+ c TqE+ c 
DE9 EE8 F=DuE 
={a+} c TrD+c TrE+ c Tr,- by (IO), (11) 
DE9 EE$ F=DuE 
ich establishes (6). Cl 
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7.3. Completeness of ( 
7.7. mma. If p, q are jinite processes and p E: q, then ( 
It is enough by Lemma 7.6 to prove, that, for p, q in nf, if p&E q, then 
) t--p& q. This is shown by induction. 
So assume p, q are in nf and C: q. There are various cases according to whether 
p is in T- or h-nf and whether fi is a summand. As an example we do the case 
where p is in T-nf and Q is not a summand, say 
p= c %z+ c TpD= 
UED’ DE9 
Then In is not a summand of q (consider l must e’SUCC). Since p CT: q and p +‘, 
by Theorem 5.13, q *T also. So q is in T-nf, say 
q= c a%+ c TqE= 
ac E' EESP 
. D'=E'. 
en p may aSUCC. So q may aSUCC and a E E’. Conversely, if 
B”SUCC. So pm a”SUCC and a E D’. Cl 
Claim 2. 9 = %. 
roof. Take D E 9 and suppose D’- D = {a,, . . . , a,} (it might be the empty set). 
For any a E D, p may &i, . . . &aSUCC. So q may &i, . . . &aSUCC and 3 E c %.a E 
E c D. Since this is true for any a E D, by (73) DE 8. Conversely, take E E 8 and 
suppose D’- E = {a,, . . . , a,}. For any a E E, q mustea, . . . &FAIL. So 
e0, . . . IL and 3DE 9.aE DE E. By (73) again, E E 9. Cl 
3. ForanyaED&B,p~c=~q~. 
Take a E D E 9. Suppose p: may t. Then p may &i, . . . &at (where D’- D = 
{ al,**=, a,,}) and so q may hi, . . . &at. Hence, 3 E E 9 such that a E E IE D and 
4: y t. But, by (74) and Lemma 7.3, 
)+Tq,E+q:=QfiD. 
So 9: y t and pr sL qf. Now suppose pf must t. Then p must &I, . . . anat since, 
for any D”c D, 
+Tp,D”++P;. 
1 . . . g,at and q: ence, pfl C” qfl. Finally, it is simple to check 
paid E: qf using Theorem 5.13. d’ 
. For any a E D’, pa C-E qa. 
The proof is similar to that of the preceding claim, using (75) instead of 
he induction hypothesis, for each a E D E 
)+pC q follows usin 
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7. . The proofs of Lemmas 7.3-7.7 are such that a proof of Theorem 6.1 
may be obtained by omitting all mention of Q (and effecting such simplification as 
then becomes possible). 
In order to extend Lemma 7.7 to cover infinite processes, we restrict processes 
to be of finite sort. The sort of up is the set of actions in which p could conceivably 
engage as expressed in the following definition. 
nition. For any term u, define sort(u) G A u i as follows: 
sort(NIL)=sort(R)=sort(x)=P), 
sort( au) - {a} u sort(u), SOrt(TU) = sort(u) 
sort(u[S])={S(a)laEsort(u)}, sort(rec X.U) = kJ sort((rec xu)“). 
new 
Clearly, any finite process has finite sort. One simple way to ensure that all 
processes have finite sort is to require that A u d be finite. We need not be so 
restrictive however as is shown in the next proposition. 
7.10. Proposition. Suppose that p is such that any renaming S which occurs in p satisjies 
{bl3a.S(a) defined and S(a)= 6) isjkite. 
Then sort(p) is finite. 
Proof. One shows by induction on terms that if x,, . . . , x, are all the free variables 
of u, then there is a finite set A, c A u d’ such that 
The supposition on renamings in the proposition is equivalent o allowing arbitrary 
restrictions and finite relabellings [ 111. 
a. If p is a jinite process, q is a sort-jinite process and p GE_ q, then there 
is an n < o such that pc: qn. 
Suppose p&z q and p is finite. Since p is finite, we can hope to specify its 
behaviour under testing in a finite manner. We do this by picking out finitely many 
tests whose interaction with p gives all the testing properties of p. There exists a k 
such that any chain 
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has length <k By the proof of Lemma 5.12(ii), for any test t, there is an n c o such 
that 
0( t, qm) = 0( t, q) for all 111> n. (12) 
Let T be the set of all L-tests such that 
(i) all actions occurring in a test are taken from {e} u sort(p) u sort(q); 
(ii) for any action Q, any two occurrences of a refusal a” in the same test must 
be separated by an acceptance b, some b; 
(iii) there are no more than k acceptances in a test. 
Then T is plainly finite since sort(p), sort(q) are finite. So bv (12) there is an n < o 
such that, for all t E T, 0( t, q”) = 0( t, q). It is not hard to see that p cc q” (translate 
any L-test t into a member of T in the obvious way by identifying all actions outside 
sort(p) u sort( q) with e and removing repetitions of refusals). Finally, q eT iff 
q” ** (as we can choose n 2 l), and so p EC q”. Cl 
heorem (Completeness Th rem). If p, q are (possibly injinite) processes, q 
is of jinite sort, and p EC q, then 
f. Assume p C: q. Take m < o. Then, by Lemma 7.11, there is an n <=: w such 
pm r; q*. By L ma 7.7, (R)t-p”~q”. By Lemma 6.5, (R)t-q”~q. So 
)+p”c-q. But then )t-pcq using the rule Id. El 
The restriction that q be of finite sort in the previous two results would not be 
necessary if we were dealing with De Nicola & Hennessy testing. We now show 
that with refusal testing it cannot be removed. 
[6, Lemma 4.1.8)]. If p isjinite and (R)t-pcq, then there is 
By induction on the proof of p E q. Cl 
7. e. Let p=R+a, q=recx.aa,+Tx[S], where S(qi)=qi+l (icw) (see 
Fig. 11). Then p C: q. owever, for any n, p G$ qn. Also, by Proposition 7.13 and 
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Just as in the case of finite processes (Proposition 6.2), C-L and & may be 
characterised by adding to ( 
Ll TX&TX+ Y, Ul 7x+ Yc,7X 
respectively, which are easily checked to be sound. 
First note that 
L2 7x+fl=7x 
is a derived axiom of ( ) + Ll (use Ll and Cl2). Also, 
is a derived axiom of ( )+Ul (use Ul, fl2, fl3). 
7.15. Definition. (a) At-, &, T,_-normal forms are defined in the same way as A-, 
a-, T-nf s (Definition 7.2), except that in the definition of TL-nf, fi is not allowed 
to be a summand (so that (72) is vacuous). p is in L-nf iff p is in AL- or TL-nf. 
(b) &J-, a u-, Tu-normal forms are defined in the same way as AL-, a‘-, q_-nfs, 
except that the only process in a-nf is Q. p is in U-nf ifI p is in AU- or Tu-nf. 
It is now a simple matter to convert any finite process into L-nf or U-nf using 
the systems (R) + Ll, ( ) + Ul and axicms L2, U2 respectively. Then completeness 
results analogous to Lemma 7.7 and Theorem 7.12 can be obtained. 
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